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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lannette Kay Johnson moved to suppress her statements made during a traffic
stop and the evidence obtained from the search of her vehicle. The district court denied
her motion. She entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the
district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Ms. Johnson appeals from the district
court’s judgment of conviction, contending the district court erred by denying her motion
to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Ms. Johnson committed the crime
of possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.16–17.) This allegation arose out of a
traffic stop wherein the police found methamphetamine in Ms. Johnson’s vehicle.
(R., pp.64–65.) Ms. Johnson waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound
her over to district court. (R., pp.28, 30.) The State filed an Information charging
Ms. Johnson with possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.31.)
Ms. Johnson filed a motion to suppress, arguing the evidence found in her
vehicle was the result of a warrantless search and her statements made during the
traffic stop were involuntary. (R., pp.38–39.) The State responded in opposition.
(R., pp.51–59.) The State also filed an Amended Information, charging Ms. Johnson
with a sentencing enhancement for a prior felony drug offense. (R., pp.47–48.)
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The district court held a hearing on the motion. (R., pp.62–63; see generally
Tr. Vol. I,1 p.4, L.2–p.48, L.4.) Ms. Johnson and Deputy Stewart testified, and a video
recording of the stop was admitted into evidence. (Tr. Vol. I, p.4, L.14–p.46, L.24; see
Def.’s Ex. A (hereinafter, Video).) After the hearing, the district court issued a decision
with the following factual findings:
During daylight hours on April 24, 2013, Deputy Stewart witnessed
a van pull partially into oncoming traffic before making a left-hand turn.
Deputy Stewart stopped the van for the violation and contacted the driver,
[Ms. Johnson]. Deputy Stewart noticed that Ms. Johnson’s eyes were
glossy, had dilated pupils, and she was shaking. After initial contact,
Deputy Stewart turned off his overhead lights that were visible to
Ms. Johnson. He then told her that he would only be issuing a warning,
but he asked her to step out of the van and move to the back of the
vehicle to speak with him.
Once Ms. Johnson was outside, Deputy Stewart told Ms. Johnson
that he believed she had substances in her system and Ms. Johnson
admitted to consuming alcohol that day and to smoking marijuana two
weeks prior. Deputy Stewart told Ms. Johnson that due to her
nervousness, he believed she had something illegal in the vehicle and that
her nervousness would go away if she would be honest with him.
Ms. Johnson admitted that she had marijuana and a pipe in her purse and
Deputy Stewart asked Ms. Johnson to reach in and pull her purse out of
the van. Ms. Johnson reached in and began rummaging through her purse
instead of retrieving it. Deputy Stewart called her name multiple times to
get her to stop rummaging, and when Ms. Johnson continued rummaging
in her purse, Deputy Stewart detained her and placed her in handcuffs for
officer safety and evidence preservation. While Deputy Stewart was
conducting an initial pat down search, but before he could advise
Ms. Johnson of her Miranda rights and not in response to any questioning
by Deputy Stewart, Ms. Johnson said that there may be
methamphetamine in the vehicle.
Deputy Stewart completed his pat down search and read
Ms. Johnson her Miranda rights before Ms. Johnson stated again that
there may be methamphetamine in her purse. She told Deputy Stewart
that her daughter’s boyfriend put the methamphetamine in her purse and
that she wanted to cooperate with law enforcement to get her daughter
There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a
transcript of the suppression motion hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains a
transcript of the entry of plea hearing. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the
sentencing hearing.

1

2

help. After two more deputies arrived, Deputy Stewart asked for
permission to search the vehicle for the drugs. Ms. Johnson gave consent
along with specific instructions on how to open the van’s door. Deputy
Stewart found the methamphetamine in the van . . . .
(R., pp.64–65.) Based on these facts, the district court determined the warrantless
search of Ms. Johnson’s vehicle was lawful because Ms. Johnson provided Deputy
Stewart with voluntary consent. (R., pp.66–67.) The district court also determined her
statements were admissible because they were made out of custody or voluntarily.
(R., pp.67–69.) Thus, the district court denied the motion. (R., p.69.)
Ms. Johnson and the State entered into an Idaho Criminal Rule 11 conditional
plea agreement. (R., pp.135–38.) Ms. Johnson reserved the right to appeal the district
court’s denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.135–36.) Ms. Johnson pled guilty to
possession of a controlled substance, and the State dismissed the sentencing
enhancement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, L.19–p.10, L.20; R., pp.149, 158.) The district court
sentenced Ms. Johnson to five years, with two years fixed, suspended her sentence,
and placed her on probation. (Tr. Vol. III, p.17, L.23–p.18, L.7; R., pp.162–65.)
Ms. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.166–68, 176–78, 181–83.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Johnson’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Johnson’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Ms. Johnson submits that the district court erred by denying her motion to

suppress her statements and the evidence found in her vehicle. She argues the district
court erred because her statements were the result of a custodial interrogation without
Miranda2 warnings and her consent to search was not voluntary.
B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a

motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). “The Court accepts
the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142
Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of
constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Johnson’s Motion To Suppress
There were two issues raised by Ms. Johnson’s suppression motion: the

warrantless search of her vehicle and her statements made during the stop. (R., pp.38–
39.) Each issue will be addressed in turn.
1.

Ms. Johnson’s Consent To Search Her Vehicle Was Not Voluntary

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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issued on probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho
791, 796 (2003) (citations omitted). Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007); State v. Jaborra, 143
Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006). “It is the State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or
coercion, direct or implied.” Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97.
“A voluntary decision is one that is ‘the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.’ An individual’s consent is involuntary, on the other
hand, ‘if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired.’” Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). To
determine whether an individual’s will was overborne in a particular case, “the court
must assess ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics
of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
at 226). “In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the
consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police
questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who
consents.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229; accord, e.g., State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,
852 (2001); State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct. App. 2011). Factors
pertaining to the subjective state of the person who consents include “lack of
education,” “low intelligence,” and “the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226. Additional factors include: (a) the number of
officers involved in the confrontation; (b) the location and conditions of the consent,
such as the time of day; (c) if the police retained the individual’s identification; (d)
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whether the individual was free to leave; and (e) whether the individual knew of his right
to refuse consent. Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97.
In this case, the totality of the circumstances shows that Ms. Johnson’s consent
to search the vehicle was not voluntary. At the time of her consent, Ms. Johnson was
not free to leave. (R., p.65.) Ms. Johnson was in handcuffs. (R., p.65.) She was
detained for approximately forty minutes and in handcuffs for half of that time. (Video,
19:38–20:20, 41:15–41:28.) Not only was Ms. Johnson restrained for an extended
period of time, but also outnumbered by the police. There were three officers present
when Deputy Stewart asked for Ms. Johnson to consent. (R., p.65.) Moreover,
Ms. Johnson’s testimony and her conduct shown on the video indicate that she had a
vulnerable subjective state at the time. During her testimony, she explained that her
interaction with the police was “fuzzy” and she had a difficult time remembering stressful
events due to post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.20–p.10, L.25.) In the
video, Ms. Johnson informs Deputy Stewart multiple times that she is exhausted, her
head is pounding, and she needs to get to work. (Video, 12:47–13:03, 14:09–15:12,
17:33–17:48.) In light of these facts, Ms. Johnson did not give voluntary consent to
search her vehicle. Therefore, the district court erred by denying her motion to
suppress.
2.

Ms. Johnson’s Statements Were The Product Of A Custodial Interrogation
Without Miranda Warnings

“Miranda v. Arizona requires that a person be informed of his or her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to custodial interrogation;
otherwise, incriminating statements are inadmissible.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791,
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795 (2003). “Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is ‘in custody’” and subject
to an “interrogation.” State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576 (2010); Hansen, 138 Idaho at
795. If the defendant provides a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his
Miranda rights, the defendant’s statements made during a custodial interrogation may
be admitted at trial. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 n.7 (2011); State v. Doe, 137
Idaho 519, 523 (2002).
“A person is in custody whenever subjected to a restraint on his or her liberty in
any degree similar to a formal arrest.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795 (citations omitted). “To
determine whether custody has attached, ‘a court must examine all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)).
Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the
person’s freedom of movement (including whether the person is placed in
handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the detention is more than
temporary, the location and visibility of the interrogation, whether other
individuals were present, the number of questions asked, the duration of
the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of
officers present, the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the
conduct of the officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning.
State v. Christensen, 159 Idaho 339, 351 (Ct. App. 2015). “The test is an objective one
and ‘the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would
have understood his situation.’” James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)). “A person is interrogated whenever subjected to express
questioning or its functional equivalent, i.e. anything reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795.
Here, the district court divided Ms. Johnson’s statements into two periods: (1)
statements made from Ms. Johnson’s initial contact with Deputy Stewart until he
8

restrained her with handcuffs; and (2) statements made from Deputy Stewart restraining
Ms. Johnson until he provided her with Miranda warnings. (R., p.68.) With respect to the
first period, the district court then determined:
Ms. Johnson was not in custody during the first period because a
reasonable person in her situation would not have believed she was in
custody. The traffic stop was reasonable in duration and during daylight
hours. Deputy Stewart even turned off his overhead lights that were visible
to Ms. [Johnson] so that she would feel free to leave. Deputy Stewart’s
questions were also reasonable in number and intensity and his overall
conduct towards Ms. Johnson during the encounter was calm, respectful,
and not intimidating. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant did not
establish that she was in custody during this portion of the pre-Miranda
traffic stop.
(R., p.68.) For the second period, the district court reasoned:
Ms. Johnson was not under arrest for the second period of the preMiranda stop, and even if she were custody for Miranda purposes, the
statements she made prior to being read her Miranda rights are
admissible because they were not made as a result of any police
questioning. Miranda rights protect individuals from self-incrimination as a
result of police questioning, so aside from custody, there must also be
questioning for them to apply. Deputy Stewart did not ask any questions
during this period and all statements made by Ms. Johnson were
volunteered. Therefore, the statements made post-custody, but preMiranda warning are admissible.
(R., p.69.) Ms. Johnson submits that these determinations were in error in light of the
facts found by the district court.
Ms. Johnson contends that the totality of the circumstances show she was in
custody during the first period. For example, Ms. Johnson asked early on if there was
“anything else” Deputy Stewart needed because she had to get to work, but he ignored
this question and continued with his investigation. (Video, 14:09–14:25.) Under these
circumstances, a reasonable person in Ms. Johnson’s position would not have felt she
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was “at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct.
1181, 1189 (2012) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
Similarly, Ms. Johnson contends that the totality of the circumstances show she
was subject to the functional equivalent of an interrogation during the second period.
Once Ms. Johnson reached inside her vehicle, she was quickly restrained in handcuffs
by Deputy Stewart because he believed she could be reaching to grab a weapon.
(Video, 19:25–19:54.) She then immediately informed Deputy Stewart that she was not
getting a weapon, but she “grabbed a pouch for someone” and “I think there’s meth.”
(Video, 19:38–20:55.) Under these circumstances, Deputy Stewart’s comments about a
weapon in the vehicle were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
In light of these facts, the district court erred by denying Ms. Johnson’s motion to
suppress her statements because the requirements of custody and interrogation were
met during both periods.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
of judgment and commitment and reverse the district court’s order denying her motion
to suppress.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2016.

___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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